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Introduction
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union the United States has been in the enviable position of being the world's only undisputed superpower. Having emerged victorious from the Cold War, the global regional crises that arose during the decade of the 1990s never truly posed a concern of national proportion to our nation. But even as the first Cold War came to an end, indications of a possible second Cold War loomed on the horizon; this new potential adversary was, and still is, the People's Republic of China (PRC) .
Through most of the U.S.-Soviet Union Cold War, we maintained a tenuous relationship with the PRC, but the obvious and primary adversary remained the Soviet Union. However, relations with China began to improve in the early 1970s as China recognized the threat posed to her own national security by the Soviet Union. The outlook was positive and we cultivated a mutually beneficial relationship that helped contain the Soviet threat, often implementing workarounds on contentious issues like the delicate China-Taiwan relationship and PRC weapons proliferations. Through the remainder of the 1970s and until 1989 the relationship between the U.S. and the PRC developed.
Unfortunately the end of the Cold War coincided with the much-publicized 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. To the U.S. public this signaled that we would soon be dealing with another repressive government after the fall of the Soviet Union. The improving public and political image of the PRC stalled, practically leaving U.S. policymakers with no choice but to acknowledge and more critically condemn the dark side of the PRC. Although we continued to maintain cordial relations with China through the 1990s, Sino-American cooperation was largely limited to the economic sphere.
Military interactions with China have remained fragile since the cooling of relations in 1989. Almost reminiscent of our Cold War confrontations with the Soviet Union, the subsequent years witnessed numerous military incidents that hampered our ability to improve ties with China.
The 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in 1999, and the 2001 EP-3 incident are noteworthy examples of military episodes with the PRC. Nonetheless, it remains a key goal of the U.S. military to improve relations with the People's Liberation Army (PLA). 1 The predicament: how does the U.S. develop military-to-military relations with China?
Presenting an appropriate and convenient solution to this difficult military cooperation quandary is the global war on terrorism.
The attacks of September 11, 2001 clearly illustrated the evolution of terrorist organizations, particularly Al Qaeda, into complex and far-reaching trans-national networks. At the heart of Al Qaeda's effort is their campaign of terror against the United States. To suppose,
however, that the United States is the only target of trans-national terrorism would be a serious miscalculation. In the case of Al Qaeda, they have webbed a terrorist network that spreads from North Africa through the Middle East and South Asia all the way to the extremes of Southeast Asia. Some have even speculated that with the success of U.S. counter-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan, which has been the base of the Al Qaeda network since 1996, the group may shift their center of operations to some location in Southeast Asia. Global terrorism is our most noteworthy contemporary challenge and although it presents an opportunity to establish closer relations with a world power that might otherwise become a much more significant global competitor, the possible benefits go beyond the war on terrorism.
Our recent success in Iraq has eliminated one member of the Axis of Evil yet two other equally, if not more, threatening members remain. In certainly one case, North Korea, the PRC could prove to be our best chance of reaching a non-violent solution to a fifty-year standoff. 3 The Korean
Peninsula remains a regional hot spot and the defiant rhetoric continues to flow from Pyonyang.
However, it is certainly worth contemplating the potential change in Pyonyang's tone if the U.S. Of course, we also have to ask ourselves the question "does China want U.S. involvement in its Xinjiang affair?" The likely answer is "no," but perhaps this answer best serves U.S.
interests. Even though we have offered recognition of China's predicament in Xinjiang, it may be wise for us to remain involved only with information sharing and exchange of tactics rather than actual soldiers on the ground in this region. Having only recently recognized the Uighurs as more than a nationalist separatist movement, we can best appease critics that insinuate our willingness to exploit the post-9/11 anti-Al Qaeda environment in order to serve other national interests even when it implies involving our military in another nation's messy affairs.
Another point to consider is the impact of Sino-American relations in the Asia Pacific Rim region. The U.S. maintains, and has moved to initiate, bi-lateral relations throughout Asia, most notably with India and Japan; relations seemingly designed to ensure American containment of Beijing. 10 Of course these bi-lateral relationships are mutually beneficial to both the U.S. and its respective partners. Concern would understandably arise if the U.S. appeared to be softening its stance and if it were to strengthen military relations with China. Valid as this concern may be, however, the U.S. has already publicly acknowledged the need for international cooperation in the global war on terrorism. Given the scope of the problem, the benefit to all participants of a cooperative China cannot be overlooked, even against the background of national paranoia.
The last issue to contend with is whether or not it is in China's best interest to participate in the U.S. led military counter-terrorism war. Conversely we need to also consider whether it is in the U.S.'s best interest to participate in combined military counter-terrorism operations with
China. Some members of our government have argued that such military cooperation would expose too much of our military capabilities to the Chinese, further arguing that such exchanges serve no U.S. national security interest. 11 The answer to both concerns lies in the desired future world order envisioned by the two potential partners. If both nations envision a future of mutually beneficial cooperation and international stability, which I contend they do, then military cooperation against an enemy that has had profound effect on both nations is the way ahead.
Recommendations: Matters of Operational Art
To suppose that a complete framework for Sino-American military cooperation can be accomplished in five pages would be overly optimistic and do the matter little justice. However, there are critical details that must be addressed to ensure success of this proposed military cooperation plan. They are not all encompassing aspects of coalition task force planning, but are basic issues that should form the starting point from where to embark on the establishment of a multi-national counter-terrorism cooperation effort. be based on a gradual approach that ensures the use of sound planning principles and the development of a solid organization that will be valuable to all participants. Lastly, as we move along this path of cooperation, we must recognize that the size, training, and experience of each nation's counter-terrorism force may differ greatly and will determine the actual level of force participation. By carefully managing these operational facets of counter-terrorism cooperation we will ensure the development of a strong relationship that will eventually lead to greater military cooperation with the PRC.
Command and Control
Because of its worldwide nature, the theater geometry of the global war on terrorism presents an interesting dilemma. The terrorism battlefield has no conventional boundaries and our current effort crosses the dividing lines of several unified commands. China's specific area of concern is Xianjiang, but because of the predicted shift of the Al Qaeda terrorist network to Southeast Asia and because of our desire to draw cooperation from other potential Southeast Asian partners, it may be a more pre-emptive measure to concentrate the multi-national counter-terrorism effort in PACOM's area of responsibility. Accordingly, PACOM should be given the responsibility of establishing and executing coalition military counter-terrorism operations with
China, but it should be apparent and understood that the global war on terrorism will likely cross the boundaries of different Combatant Commanders. Negotiated at the Combatant Commander level, execution of joint cooperation with the Chinese should reside at a subordinate level.
However, this clearly established U.S. military doctrine should not necessarily imply that the U.S.
be the primary sponsor of this historic arrangement.
Sponsorship of the proposed counter-terrorism military cooperation plan will be the cornerstone to success. At the national level both China and the U.S. have already demonstrated the desire to cooperate in the global war on terrorism but this does not eliminate the tricky issue of operational control of this coalition effort. The ultimate goal is to establish military-to-military cooperation with China. However, this does not imply overt willingness to leave our other regional partners behind. As we proceed on track to establishing military ties with China, the U.S. must remain ever sensitive to regional concerns of U.S. hegemony and unilateralism. We are already viewed as the international leader in the global war on terrorism, but it is critical that we foster equal commitment to the global war on terrorism from the international community, particularly China and the regional community. Although a bi-lateral arrangement with China is less than ideal, we should not be deterred from such a relationship if given no other choice. In keeping with this theme of multi-lateral cooperation, it would be much more objective for us to seek sponsorship from an appropriate international body.
The obvious choice is the United Nations. Although the UN is a well-established international governing body, I would propose that it is too big and its membership too diverse to efficiently accomplish this task. After all, the goal is military-to-military cooperation with China.
Although we do not want to proceed on a strictly bi-lateral path of cooperation, a regional organization may present a much more focused and manageable governing body. There are two organizations that standout as likely sponsorship candidates, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the ARF. The ARF is the better candidate of the two.
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The ARF was founded in 1994 to promote peace and stability throughout the Southeast Asia region and has had near-region country involvement, most notably from the U.S., China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea. Having been dubbed the region's most analogous NATO-like organization, the ARF has made noteworthy strides in its intended charter but it has been suggested that the organization has little interest in close military-to-military ties. 13 In shift to the Western Pacific Rim region, the situation is opportune to push for a more robust military cooperation commitment from the association. 14 An ARF backed coalition task force should be established to undertake the proposed counter-terrorism mission. However if the ARF is unwilling to assume sponsorship, the responsibility should revert to PACOM. Whether under the auspices of a coalition task force or a purely bi-lateral arrangement military cooperation with China should be pursued.
Task Force Organization
A reasonable approach would be to expand on the current responsibilities of a PACOM 14 The joint framework is a logical force structure for a cooperative counter-terrorism task force. Most of the proposed ARF partners have been exposed to our joint doctrine. In all likelihood the Chinese military has already given considerable study to our joint command structure. This supposition is clearly evidenced by Colonel Qio Liang and Colonel Wang Xiangsui in their military theory work. 17 Nonetheless, this assumption should not be the cornerstone upon which to construct our coalition task force. Certainly from the perspective of cooperation the ideal staff arrangement would be an integrated command, but this proved difficult in our past coalition war efforts. It is likely that a parallel command structure will again emerge as it did in Operation Desert Storm. This, however, is merely an issue of efficiency and will not necessarily imply failure of our coalition counter-terrorism initiative.
Even though leadership of the counter-terrorism arrangement will likely prove a delicate and ongoing matter, it should not deter developing a contiguous staff organization. It may seem overly optimistic to expect that the relationship will evolve into one where all responsibilities become fully integrated, but ensuring proximity of the parallel commands may minimize the inefficiencies of such a command arrangement and facilitate the establishment of staff coordination cells if required. Proximity and close contact are essential details in reaching the ultimate goal of close military-to-military cooperation with the PLA. Ultimately there is one factor that almost certainly will contribute to development of the staff organization: time. The war on terrorism is likely to be more protracted than we desire and thereby provide us the time for an agreeable and appropriate command arrangement to evolve.
Basing and Logistics
The choice of a headquarters location and bases of operation will certainly be a decision influenced by issues of politics, logistics, and fiscal constraints. Given the regional focus of the proposed task force, it is logical for the coalition headquarters to reside in the Western Pacific It should be noted, however, that our proposed headquarters and a base of operations do not need to be co-located. Arguably, they should not be co-located. It would be convenient if we could establish a regionally centered headquarters and base of operations, but the multi-national structure and the non-specific area of operations of the global war on terrorism may render a centrally located base of operations inappropriate. In the proposed relationship and command structure it should be assumed that operational logistics would remain largely a national responsibility. Consequently, each nation will maintain responsibility for the logistic requirements of its participating forces from its national base of operations to pre-determined intermediate base It is not the intent of this work to prescribe the logistics arrangement of the proposed counter-terrorism task force per se. This is a detail to be discussed in greater depth by staff members later in the planning process. What is paramount, however, is the need to ensure that lines of communication remain efficient, unobstructed, and as protected as possible. Just as our enemy has developed and come to rely on a network of cells to support his terrorist network, we too must develop a logistic network that can keep our forces sustained in whichever area of operations they may need to confront the adversary.
Staff Planning and Cooperation
The time to embark on this proposed endeavor is now because time is a factor that the global terrorist network will definitely exploit to their advantage. Unfortunately, the most notable characteristic of Sino-American relations is the abundance of events that have proved obstructions to close cooperation. Focusing specifically in the era of Communist Chinese rule rarely has there been a period when our two nation's interests shared any commonality. Although it can be firmly argued that both China and the U.S. had a shared enemy in the USSR, our cooperative effort in defeating the Soviets was relatively short-lived. Once again the Taiwan issue arose and proved to be an unsolvable dilemma early in the Reagan administration. Recognizing the enemy's ability to take advantage of time, stalling Sino-American military cooperation will not bring either country closer to defeating trans-national terrorism. Of course, the fact that our heads of state have met and discussed counter-terrorism cooperation should not imply that we jump into a collaborative effort without thorough planning. A carefully planned sequential approach should be utilized in developing a counter-terrorism program with our coalition partners. By taking a step approach we can ensure the creation of a strong foundation for cooperation, while building on supporting operational functions and sequential blocks of capability.
In keeping with the spirit of carefully planned cooperation, it will be important for planners to identify those building blocks that will lead to successful and mutually beneficial cooperation.
Perhaps the logical first step is in the area of intelligence sharing. At first glance it may seem too big of a first step that may expose too many of our secrets. Those political critics earlier cited will likely make this argument. However, given that the Chinese made the first move in this area by sharing intelligence with us in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, it is difficult to argue that the information sharing arrangement has not already been established, albeit informal. Moreover, the mere exchange of intelligence does not necessarily imply the disclosure of technology and capabilities. Because of the severe threat posed by trans-national terrorism, it is hard to believe that the benefits to be gained would outweigh the detrimental aspects of carefully planned intelligence sharing.
Factors Force and Space
Participating forces will largely be a matter of national determination, but we must remain objective to the reality that participating nations may not have military force structures that resemble ours. Counter-terrorism has become a major warfare area in the U.S. The same cannot necessarily be said of our potential partners. Participating countries may not place the counterterrorism responsibility squarely on the shoulders of its military forces, opting instead to place the responsibility completely within the law enforcement community. A prime illustration of this fact is China. Responsibility for China's internal security, and presumably its internal terrorism problem, lies with the People's Armed Police (PAP). Though the name connotes law enforcement, the PAP is a paramilitary force that falls under the control of the Central Military
Commission and supports major armed forces divisions in wartime. 20 If we expect China to extend its counter-terrorism efforts, it will be necessary to give China the latitude to provide those forces they determine appropriate and perhaps give them the space to develop their international counter-terrorism capability. Already we have seen indications from the PRC that they are moving their military forces into the counter-terrorism mission area. However, this transformation is still in its infancy. 21 This may present some difficulties for the U.S. because the preponderance of our military counter-terrorism force comes from the special operations community.
Nonetheless, issues of national military training should not affect the exchange of tactics in combating terrorism.
Another force matter to consider, at least initially, is the ability to initiate counter-terrorism cooperation without the need for additional military forces. A selling point for both U.S.
constituents as well as the coalition community is the ability to conduct counter-terrorism cooperation with those forces already committed by respective national policy. Except for instances where specific counter-terrorism forces may need to be deployed for an exercise, like the BALIKATAN exercise series in the Philippines, no additional personnel should be expected. The development of counter-terrorism force structure will be left a matter of national interest. The initial stages of counter-terrorism cooperation with our multi-national partners will be information exchanges and the coordination of efforts. Counter-terrorism techniques and tactics are another form of exchange that would be a reasonable form of military-to-military cooperation for early contact. Eventually, the arrangement should evolve into combined operations, but once more, the forces already committed by each nation to its own counter-terrorism campaign can accomplish this level of cooperation.
It is easy for the U.S. to overlook the fact that we have taken numerous operations of the global war on terrorism a great distance from our shores. Although we expect our coalition partners in the global war on terrorism to be fully supportive of this effort, it remains a consideration that the battle space may be within the borders of our coalition partners. It will certainly be in their backyard. Initially, the level of involvement we should expect will have to be tempered by political realities. In determining our engagement areas, we should expect a level of cooperation that varies from the Philippines, where we exercise and operate closely with the Philippine Armed Forces to possibly China, where we may not be as welcome to operate forces.
The global terrorism battle space may remain illusive but it is real. Whether the mountains of South Asia or the jungles and littorals of Southeast Asia, it will only be through cooperation that we will be able to exploit the battle space to the detriment of our terrorist adversaries.
Future Operations
Because of its overwhelming and contemporary relevance counter-terrorism collaboration is a logical first step to lasting and mutually beneficial cooperation. The military imperative will be to foster future military cooperation. This goal, however, should come as a matter of due course through programs like theater exercises. The theater exercise program is the principal method for furthering military cooperation. It is certainly intriguing to envision a Sino-American counter-terrorism exercise. Although we are several building blocks from this reality, military-tomilitary cooperation will eventually make it possible. In the immediate future, however, current theater exercises already provide the opportunity for increased contact. During Cobra Gold 2002 the PRC sent personnel to Thailand to observe the exercise. The previously mentioned BALIKATAN is another potential exercise for PRC involvement. Certainly the participation of military observers like those in Cobra Gold is a reasonable level of participation to foster in BALIKATAN. Perhaps our counter-terrorism cooperation will lead to combating another transnational regional concern, piracy. To certain members of the ASEAN community, piracy is arguably just as serious a concern as terrorism. There are numerous potential future military exchanges with China. Search and rescue exercises, ship rider exchanges, helicopter flight deck inter-operability demonstrations are among a host of other potential avenues towards closer military-to-military contact with China.
Optimistically, we may eventually reach a level of cooperation with the PRC that will allow for cooperation and exercising of major warfare areas. For the immediate future, however, it would be in the interest of regional sensitivity that we remain aloof towards demonstrating capabilities in such areas like amphibious warfare, anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, and air warfare. For obvious reasons these are warfare areas that do not foster a spirit of cooperation with the PRC and should be avoided. To pretend that exercising these mission areas in the Asia Pacific Rim region is not fundamentally aimed at countering a Chinese threat would be pointless and patronizing.
Conclusion
The fact remains that we will be the world's only super-power for some time to come, possibly for the majority of the twenty-first century. By one estimate, China's anticipated emergence as a breakout Asian economic power is one of the few highlights in the early part of this century. 22 In part, China's own interest in economic growth has forced it to revisit its military force structure and recognize that its national budget is better spent in the development of its domestic economy. Nonetheless, China's regional military capabilities will slowly improve as it continues to ensure its national security and strives for increased global influence.
The global war on terrorism has placed us at a crossroads of Sino-American military relations. Although the U.S. may be tempted by Sino-phobic fears of losing our military competitive edge over China, we must assuage these concerns and give way to the geo-political realities presented by trans-national terrorism. Trans-national terrorism has no borders and is a challenge to the international community. The fact that we are presented with this means to cooperate with a potential foe should be used to our advantage in order to both foster regional security in the Asia-Pacific region and to further our efforts in the global war on terrorism. We will maintain our military technology advantage over the PRC, but they will continue to evolve.
The question we must answer is whether or not we want to have an active part in shaping what
China's military evolves into and the force posture she assumes in the future. If we decide on active engagement, then military-to-military cooperation is the in-road by which we will accomplish this end. 
